Meta-ethics
Meta-ethics: whether morality is objective, moral realism and its rivals, fictionalism, relativism, non-cognitivism and why be moral.
“Killing is wrong” and “You ought not lie” are moral statements, but what kind of claims are they? This course considers philosophical questions about the foundations of morality: whether and in what sense morality is objective, the nature of moral discourse, and how moral knowledge is possible. It moves through moral realism, with naturalism and non-naturalism, moral explanations and disagreement, then the anti-realist views of fictionalism, relativism and non-cognitivism, and ends by asking why anyone should be moral.
What You Will Achieve
- Distinguish naturalist and non-naturalist versions of moral realism
- Assess arguments from moral explanation and moral disagreement
- Compare fictionalism, relativism and non-cognitivism about moral claims
- Write philosophy papers that defend a position in meta-ethics
Program Overview
Moral Realism
Is morality objective, and in what sense?
- Introduction to meta-ethics
- Naturalism versus non-naturalism
- Moral explanations
- Disagreement and oddness
Moral Anti-Realism
Views that deny moral facts or reinterpret moral talk.
- Fictionalism
- Relativism
- Non-cognitivism
Why Be Moral?
Morality and practical reason.
- Reason and morality
Course Completion
Job Outlook
Careful reasoning about moral claims serves philosophy, law, public policy and ethics work in medicine and technology.
Good for: Students with some philosophy who want to examine what moral claims are and whether they can be true.
Keep in mind: A fall 2015 course whose posted materials are the session plan and the paper assignments with examples; the readings and lectures are not included.
Bottom line: A clear tour of the main positions in meta-ethics, realism and its rivals alike.
Frequently Asked Questions
What does meta-ethics ask?
Questions about the foundations of morality rather than which acts are right: whether morality is objective, what moral statements mean, and how moral knowledge is possible.
Which anti-realist views are covered?
Fictionalism, relativism and non-cognitivism, each examined in the second part of the course after the case for moral realism.
What writing does the course set?
Two papers, with examples of student work among the posted materials, and guest lectures by Nilanjan Das and Matt Mandelkern during the term.



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